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Abstract
This paper revisits the soft budget constraint problem, pushing sub-
central (state) borrowing to the limit in multi-tiered countries. Accounting
for the institutional design and political practice common to many federa-
tions, bargaining and log-rolling are introduced to the analysis. In our in-
tertemporal model, a federal legislature of regionally elected representatives
bargains on federal grants going to the states. As a result, voters will elect
federal candidates in favour of looser state public spending than otherwise
expected. This strategic voting not only leads to overly generous bailout
policies. Also, and compared to a setting where federal decision making does
not follow from bargaining and regional affiliation, states over-borrow more
inefficiently. Allowing for heterogeneity in state income and population does
not affect this inefficient outcome. Lower relative per capita incomes even
boost federal generosity and subsequent over-borrowing by the states.
∗CES, KU Leuven
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1 Introduction
In most multi-tiered countries today, sub-central governments only partially cover
expenditures with own revenue raising. Indeed, the share of lower-level spending
left unfinanced by subnational revenues was 35,4% across OECD countries in 1998
(World Bank, 2000), and runs a lot higher in non-OECD countries. Such a 'vertical
fiscal gap' is usually bridged by use of grants going from the federal to the state
level, or by state borrowing when allowed.1 Now, whereas convincing arguments
in favour of vertical fiscal gaps abound2, this paper zooms in on a potentially
substantive drawback. The 'soft budget constraint' (SBC) problem.
Following Rodden et al. (2003), a state government faces a soft budget con-
straint when it can 'manipulate its access to funds in undesirable ways'. Whenever
a central government is willing to finance subnational deficits the argument goes,
forward-looking state politicians have an incentive to over-borrow (Besfamille and
Lockwood, 2008). A dynamic commitment problem in other words, where the cen-
ter cannot credibly commit to a 'no bailout' policy ex ante, and states tap into the
common pool of national funds by piling up debt.3 Various studies have empirically
identified such commitment problems, which can result both in last minute rescue
attempts in the face of imminent defaults, or in routine gap-filling discretionary
transfers.4
Contributing to the growing body of theoretical work on soft budget constraints,
we focus on what is key to the issue. Why would the center be willing to step in
when public finances take a turn for the worse at state-level?5 So far this systematic
federal intervention has mainly been rationalised from a size or an equalisation
perspective (Breuillé and Vigneault, 2010). Wildasin (1997) finds a state's size to
positively affect its likelihood of obtaining a bailout. This 'too big to fail' argument
is challenged by Crivelli and Staal (2013), by modeling the spill-overs of state public
provision differently. In both papers however, the central government's incentive
to prop up public spending in under-performing states stems precisely from the
size of these spill-overs. Not so in most work, where the aim of equalising marginal
utility of public provision across regions is what compels the central government
1In what follows we only focus on the regional tier within a federation, being the state level.
Much of our results would also apply to the municipal level however.
2See e.g. Boadway & Shah (2009) for an overview of the extensive literature on Fiscal Feder-
alism.
3See also Kornai et al. (2003) for a wider discussion of the soft budget constraint problem in
economics, and Vigneault (2007) for a specific overview in fiscal federalism.
4For country specific studies see e.g. Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommassi (1999) for Argentina,
Poterba (1995) and Von Hagen (1991) for US States, Fink and Stratmann (2011) and Baskaran
(2012) for Germany, Borge and Rattso (2003) for Norway, Von Hagen and Dahlberg (2004) for
Sweden, Garcia-Mila, Goodspeed and McGuire (2002) or Sorribas-Navarro, (2010) for Spain and
Bordignon (2000) for Italy. A cross-country analysis was undertaken by Rodden (2002).
5Which of course does not mean that other aspects deserve less attention. Breuillé et al. (2006)
or Köthenburger (2004) e.g. discuss the effect of tax competition on the SBC problem. Inman
(2001) incorporates a reputation for hard budget constraints on the part of the federal government.
Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) question whether a hard budget constraint is always best from
an efficiency point of view. Akai and Silva (2009) cover the impact of income redistribution on
over-borrowing. Breuillé and Vigneault (2010) lastly, look at a federal setup consisting of three
tiers of government, in stead of the usual two.
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to intervene.6 The intuition here is that a benevolent central government keeps
the well-being of all of its citizens close to heart, to the extent that bailing out a
profligate state becomes inevitable as soon as e.g. police departments or schools
start closing. So even in the absence of spill-overs, bailouts may come about. Now,
even though both size and equalisation go a long way in explaining soft budget
constraints, surely other considerations have a part to play as well.
Strikingly, the question whether political and institutional factors give rise to
overly generous central governments has remained on the fringe of theoretical anal-
ysis. Goodspeed's (2002) political economy model is a notable exception. Here too
a central government nudges up grants in response to state borrowing. To keep wel-
fare from falling as before, but just as well to maximize expected votes. Depending
on a probability of re-election which is assumed different across states, the federal
level decides 'as one' in which states to keep welfare up and collect the most votes.
Arguably, such a model may explain bailout behaviour in multi-tiered countries
where the central level holds sway over much of regional policy or legislation (e.g.
the Netherlands or Italy).7 In such a setting, a central government can indeed
relatively unilaterally decide on bailouts, united in its goal of re-election. Favour-
ing one region over the other would then be a rational and doable strategy.8 In
full-fledged federations however, political decision making is rarely this top-down
oriented, and federal politicians are far less like-minded once in office.
Consider e.g. the case of Belgium, where nationwide parties have long since
disappeared from the political arena. As a result, the federal government can
hardly be described as a single entity independent of state interests. Once parties
win the election in their respective state and find themselves in the federal coalition,
they will always defend the interests of those that keep them there: the voters of
their own state. Federal decision making is therefore to a large degree interwoven
with regional interests, with bargaining at the federal level serving as the mediating
process.
This kind of regional affiliation isn't limited to the Belgian case moreover, as
complex regional bargaining and log-rolling often characterize the legislative pro-
cess in federations (Rodden, 2002, 2003; Cremer and Palfrey, 1999). In terms of
Ducacheck's (1985) continuum, whenever majority rule starts losing ground to con-
sensus based democracy (consociationalism), and locally elected politicians start
behaving like state representatives, bargaining and logrolling become common prac-
tice in the federal government (Lijphart, 1977, 1985). By consequence, institutional
design and political practice may prompt a federal government to bail out all states
in financial distress, and not just the ones where the most votes are to be found.
Since each state is to a certain extent represented in the federal government, not
a single state will be allowed to fail. By trading policy votes on bailouts, federal
representatives in turn secure regional public provision whenever their state runs
6See Caplan et al., 2000; Köthenburger, 2004; Breuillé et al., 2006; Breuillé and Vigneault,
2010; Akai and Sato, 2008; Akai and Silva, 2009.
7Although typically such a top-down institutional setup leaves less borrowing autonomy in
regional hands. See Rodden (2002) for a cross country overview of regional borrowing autonomy
indeces.
8Also Robinson and Torvik (2009) conceptualise bailouts as a means to transfer income to
potential supporters, yet focusing on entrepreneurs, not citizens of a specific region.
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into financial trouble.
On the surface, regional affiliation generates the exact same results equalisation
would bring about. In both cases every single profligate state is bailed out, the im-
pact of default on other states or on the macro-economic stability of the federation
notwithstanding. Dig a little deeper though, and substantial differences emerge.
We size up this specific effect of regional affiliation using the citizen-candidate
approach, following Besley and Coate (2003). In such a setup, representatives par-
ticipate in a federal legislature once elected locally, and start bargaining on public
spending. They agree on an allocation which maximises their joint surplus, exactly
the outcome regional affiliation is expected to produce. Moreover, by focusing on
an intertemporal setting where states are allowed to borrow and the federal govern-
ment co-finances regional spending, our model sets the stage for bailout incentives
to take shape.
Putting the model to work, voters are shown to elect federal representatives
with a higher preference for debt accumulation than their own preference type.
Such types will mind less when the state they represent accumulates debt, or
may even advocate loose regional spending. As a result, they are more generous
when compensating for state borrowing as they tap the national common pool and
increase federal grants. Knowing this in advance, voters will turn this behaviour to
their advantage by voting in precisely such generous types.9 Such strategic voting
behaviour not only leads to overly generous bailout policies. Also, and compared
to a setting where federal decision making does not follow from bargaining and
regional affiliation, states over-borrow more inefficiently because of this federal
generosity. Allowing for heterogeneity in state income and population does not
affect this inefficient outcome lastly. Lower relative per capita incomes even boost
federal generosity and subsequent over-borrowing by the states.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the citizen-
candidate approach in further detail, and introduce the framework of the model.
Sections 3 to 5 derive the main findings regarding federal, voter and state decision
making subsequently. Section 6 brooches the subject of state heterogeneity, after
which section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
In the citizen-candidate model developed by Besley and Coate (1997), public pro-
vision is determined by a legislature of locally elected representatives. This pans
out as follows in our federal configuration. Each state of the federation marks a
constituency, from which one candidate is chosen to represent this respective state
in the federal legislature. Representatives then band together, and start bargaining
on federal public spending based on their personal preferences. Their behaviour at
this point is described by the utilitarian bargaining solution, which means they will
9An alternative interpretation here would be that federal candidates market themselves as
advocates of regional interests, to attract more votes. Such regional profiling will perform better
whenever the shared sense of national unity goes wanting.
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agree to a specific allocation which maximises their joint surplus.10 This makes it
a cooperative legislature, as opposed to e.g. minimum winning coalition systems.
As for regional political decision making, state governments in our model follow
the state median voter and get re-elected as long as they do.11
Much like Goodspeed (2002), we then set up a two-period game between our two
types of players: state governments on the one hand, and the federal government
on the other. Timingwise, state governments decide on taxation in both periods,
and on borrowing in period 1. All built up regional debt has to be fully repaid in
period 2, with interest. The federal government secondly, has only one decision to
make. In period 2 it will set the grants which co-finance state public provision in
that period. We assume it already decided on an initial level of grants for period 1
before play begins. This initial decision, albeit exogenous to the game, has no role
to play in its dynamics.
Strategic interactions between the players on the other hand, are crucial. The
interaction between state governments is modeled as a simultaneous Nash game,
where each state takes decisions of the other states as given when deciding on
taxation and borrowing in period 1. The same goes for the states' decisions on
taxation in period 2. The interaction between the federal and state governments
however, follows from a sequential Stackelberg game.
More specifically, states are Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the federal govern-
ment, and can anticipate federal decision making. The intuition here is that state
governments, over the years, have grown accustomed to the institutional set-up
of the federation. Because of this, anticipating the federal government's general
tendency to bargain on political consensus comes easy.12 Each state thus takes fed-
eral bargaining into account when it decides on borrowing and taxation in period
1. Put differently, states will maximise the welfare of the median voter subject to
the reaction function of the federal government. This function will describe how
federal grant allocation in period 2 responds to state borrowing in period 1. If its
derivative with respect to state borrowing is positive, state governments face a soft
budget constraint and will be tempted to over-borrow.13
Closing the model, the federal election process itself is defined by a second
Stackelberg game, which runs parallel to the first. This time it's the voters who, as
first movers, take into account the reaction function of the federal legislature. They
vote accordingly, by picking that citizen from their ranks whose preferences they
10This Utilitarian solution is motivated by the literature on universalism in legislatures (see
Weingast, 1979, as well as Inman and Fitts (1990))
11Of course, political decisions on a state level are typically made by legislatures consisting of
elected representatives as well. Our simplification here aims to capture the greater commonality
of interests across districts of a single state than across states. Besley and Coate (2003) essentially
maintain the same assumption when they model state decision making as done by a single elected
representative. Since the preference type of each state's median and mean voter is assumed to be
identical, an assumption we maintain in what follows, both approaches coincide.
12Regional affiliation thus also directly explains where actual bailout expectations of state
politicians come from, unlike other theoretical models.
13A second interaction with the federal government comes about in period 2 however, when the
state governments again decide on taxation. Here the states move simultaneously with the federal
government, taking its decision on second period grants as given. This assumption captures the
intuition that state governments only anticipate federal behaviour with respect to borrowing
decisions, but have no clue how the centre will respond to state taxation.
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expect will maximise individual welfare. By consequence, each citizen is a potential
candidate for federal office. The elections are held only once, and simultaneously
to state decision making in period 1. This means that state governments take
federal election outcomes as given, just as voters take state policy as given, which
is a logical assumption. Both state governments and voters are Stackelberg leaders
with respect to the federal political apparatus and its bargaining dynamics, but
neither can predict the actual outcome of elections. Foreseeing which exact type
of politician will 'man' the political institutions once elected, be it on the state or
federal level, lies beyond their grasp.
As Besley and Coate (2003) have shown lastly, this citizen-candidate approach
'creates incentives for voters to strategically delegate by electing representatives
with high demands for public spending'. Especially when spill-overs are absent, this
will lead to over-provision in a centralized system. Now, whilst Besley and Coate
use their model to provide stronger footing for the Oates decentralisation theorem
(the higher the spill-overs, the better the case for centralisation), we employ it here
to capture federal decision making in light of the soft budget constraint problem.14
Since our model is to be solved using backward induction, the following sec-
tion starts out with the federal government's problem. The federal government's
reaction function and its derivative, which will determine whether the federal gov-
ernment follows a hard or soft budget constraint, is discussed here in detail. Section
4 then tackles the federal voting process, followed by the regional government's de-
cision making presented in section 5.
3 The federal government
We assume a federation with m states, governed by a cooperative legislature on
the federal level, and where the federal legislators (representatives) will maximise
the following objective function:
Maxgi2
m∑
i
{UiE} (1)
As explained above and expressed by (1), them elected representatives E decide
on public spending according to the Utilitarian bargaining solution. Maximising
the sum of their own utilities, they arrive at the optimal level of period 2 per capita
grants for each state (gi2). How a specific voter of type j rose to power in state
i, in other words why his preferences were chosen above the preferences of the ni
voters living in a specific state i, will be dealt with in section 4. For now, it suffices
to see how utility of an elected legislator E representing state i is defined by per-
14By embracing the citizen-candidate approach we also circumvent the usual problems related to
Downsian models. In models with a Downsian tinge, such as Goodspeed's, citizens care about poli-
cies whilst politicians are infinitely pliable and simply want to get re-elected. A selection/voting
mechanism explaining how the government rose to power to begin with, is lacking as well. The
citizen-candidate model remedies both problems by having citizens select a candidate which acts
on his own preferences once in office, whatever these may be. See Besley (2011) for further
argumentation.
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capita public spending in his state in period 1(Xi1) and period 2(Xi2), as well as
his private consumption in period 1(Ci1) and period 2(Ci2):
UiE = ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + z (Ci1) + w (Ci2)
With z and w increasing and concave. Laying out the constraints under which
the objective function is maximised, will clarify things further. We begin with
public spending in period 1 in state i:
Xi1 = gi1 + ti1Yi1 + λ
∗
iEBi1
Here gi1 will be the per capita federal grant allocated to state i in period 1.
As specified above, this grant will be exogenous to the game. With ti1 the tax
rate set by state i in period 1, and Yi1 the per-capita private income (exogenous)
of voters living in state i, ti1Yi1 will be the state's portion in public spending.
Notice that we have assumed all voters living in the same state to have identical
private incomes. In fact, the only difference between voters within a certain state,
will be their preference type regarding debt accumulation. We assume people to
have preferences when it comes to state debt, which may be psychologically tinged
(dislike of being indebted) or simply irrational (some people just don't like the
word). Yet myopia, rational expectations or a belief in loose spending policies
could also be reflected by such preferences. The state government will then make
its borrowing decision in period 1(Bi1) taking into account these preferences (which
will be the median voter's), but more on this in section 5.
Each state is thus characterised by a range of debt preference types
[
0, λ¯i
]
,
one type per citizen, where we assume the mean type λim will be equal to the
median type. We denote the preference type of the representative elected in state
i as λ∗iE . His utility, and also the federal grant gi2 as we will see, is thus defined
by public spending Xi1 set according to this personal preference type. Actual
public spending may diverge from this preferred amount however, since the state
government follows the median voter. Moving on to public spending in period 2,
which has the borrowed amount of period 1 subtracted at the going (exogenous)
interest rate r, we get:
Xi2 = gi2 + ti2Yi2 − λ∗iEBi1(1 + r) (2)
Private consumption subsequently, will simply be the remaining after tax pri-
vate income:
Ci1 = Yi1(1− ti1)
Ci2 = Yi2(1− ti2 − tf2)
With tf2 the federal tax rate in period 2. The federal budget constraint itself
lastly, is always balanced through taxes on national incomes:
tf2
m∑
i
niYi2 =
m∑
i
nigi2
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Keeping things simple, we assume the number of voters as well as per-capita
private incomes are identical across states. Deriving and rewriting the first order
conditions of the problem, we get an expression for the optimal level of the per
capita federal grant going to state i (see Appendix A):
g∗i2 =
∂Ci2
∂w
− ti2Yi2 + λ∗iEBi1(1 + r) (3)
First of all, the grant size and the marginal utility of private consumption of
voters living in state i, are shown to be inversely related. Equally logical, we
see that grants will be lower the higher state i's spending will be. Lastly, and
most importantly here, (3) tells us how the federal government responds to state
borrowing. The first derivative of this reaction function w.r.t. state i's borrowing
decision in period 1 will be positive:
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
= λ∗iE(1 + r) > 0 (4)
As is the case in Goodspeed's (2002) model, we have thus modeled a situation
where the federal government finds it optimal to increase grant allocation when
states borrow more. The reason is simple. Since state borrowing hollows out welfare
in period 2 as can be seen in (2), the federal response will be to compensate for
this drop in public spending by use of its grants system. This is what Goodspeed
calls a 'soft budget constraint policy' which will lower the opportunity cost of
borrowing for the state governments, as we will see in section 5. So far the story
runs parallel to the equalisation approach to modeling soft budget constraints. Yet
we also learn from (4) that the federal response to state borrowing depends on
the preference type of the respective elected legislator for that state. If a state
is represented by a legislator who for some reason isn't too keen on accumulating
debt, the grant increase will be tempered. The question then evidently becomes, of
which preference type will this legislator be? Examining the federal voting process
provides us with an answer.
4 The federal voting process
Voters in each state will pick a federal representative from among their ranks,
knowing full well how this representative will behave once in office. In other words,
voters are perfectly informed of the federal bargaining process described above.
Deciding on which preference type to send to the federal level (λiE), they will
consequently maximise personal welfare based on this knowledge. In other words,
the federally optimised decision on grants (g∗i2) is included in their optimisation.
Voter j of state i will thus solve the following problem to decide on his vote:
MaxλiE ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + z (Ci1) + w (Ci2)
Subject to the same constraints as before, only now with gi2 specified by the
federal government's reaction function g∗i2(λiE):
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g∗i2 =
∂Ci2
∂wi
− ti2Yi2 + λiEBi1(1 + r) (5)
Rewriting the first order conditions of this problem, we get the following ex-
pression (see Appendix B):
λiE = λij +
∂Ci2
∂w
∑m
j 6=i (njYj2)
niYi2Bi1(1 + r)
(6)
As (6) shows, a voter of type j will vote for a candidate which is more favourably
inclined towards accumulating debt than he himself is (λiE > λij). He will vote
strategically, making full use of the knowledge that if he votes for a candidate with
such preferences, his welfare will go up. Indeed, as can be seen in (5), the per
capita grant increases in λiE . The fact that the lion's share of this grant increase
is financed by the rest of the federation makes this a welfare improving strategy
from voter j's perspective. This is a manifestation of the 'common pool problem',
which can also be seen in (6) where λiE increases as state i's share in total national
income decreases. Now, for ni voters in region i, and assuming preferences are
single peaked, the median voter with preference λim will embody the majority in
this state. The representative of state i will thus be of the following preference
type:
λ∗iE = λim +
∂Ci2
∂w
∑m
j 6=i (njYj2)
niYi2Bi1(1 + r)
(7)
We summarise in proposition 1:
Proposition 1. In a federation where a cooperative legislature of
locally elected representatives bargains on federal grants going to the
states, voters will elect candidates with a higher preference for debt
accumulation than their own preference.
The intuition here is that such candidates will mind less when the state they rep-
resent accumulates debt, or may even advocate looser regional spending. As a
result, they are more generous when compensating for state borrowing as they tap
the national common pool and increase federal grants. Knowing this in advance,
voters will turn this behaviour to their advantage by voting in precisely such gen-
erous types. An alternative interpretation here would be that federal candidates
market themselves as champions of regional interests, to attract more votes. Such
regional profiling will perform better whenever a shared sense of national unity
goes wanting. In any case, this result which will prove crucial when analysing the
decision making of state governments in what follows.
5 The state government
As explained above, a government of state i will maximise the welfare of the median
voter of type λim. To decide on spending and borrowing furthermore, it also takes
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federal bargaining into account. However, since the federal vote is held simulta-
neously to state decision making, state governments cannot predict its outcome.
In other words, the state government will take up the reaction function g∗i2 in its
optimisation problem without knowing of which type λ∗iE its representative on the
federal level will be. We consequently get the following problem:
MaxBi1,ti1,ti2Uim = ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + z (Ci1) + w (Ci2)
Subject to the same constraints as before. Deriving and rewriting the first order
conditions of this problem, we arrive at the following expression (see Appendix C):
∂Uim
∂Xi1
∂Uim
∂Xi2
=
{
Ri
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
+
(
λim(1 + r)− ∂g
∗
i2
∂Bi1
)}
1
λim
(8)
With Ri =
niYi2∑m
i niYi2
, or state i's share in total federal income. Similar to
Goodspeed's result, (8) is crucial to the model. It expresses the Marginal Rate of
Substitution (MRS) between public spending in period 1 and period 2, and will
thus be the implicit cost of borrowing faced by state i. The incentive for the state
government to over-borrow emerges here. To see this, assume first of all that the
federal government would follow a hard budget constraint policy (
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
= 0), so that
the MRS reduces to (1 + r). State borrowing would then be efficient. Now, when
the federal government follows a SBC policy (where
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
> 0) on the other hand,
this clearly will have an impact on the MRS. As soon as the cost of borrowing
comes out below (1 + r), we know the state will inefficiently over-borrow. This
will be due to a trade-off between two sorts of costs, being the tax cost and the
opportunity cost of borrowing.
The first term on the LHS of (8) describes the tax cost of borrowing. As the
federal grant increases when state i borrows federal taxation follows suit, to which
state i contributes according to its share in total federal revenue. The second term
in (8) subsequently, represents the opportunity cost of Xi1 in terms of foregone Xi2.
This cost will be reduced since the federal government increases grants if state i
borrows, as can be seen in (8). Less second period public consumption will need
to be given up to pay off the debt incurred in period 1 in this case. Now, when
this reduction in opportunity costs outweighs the increase in tax costs, state i will
over-borrow. Since states carry but a fraction of the tax cost, again because of the
common pool effect, we expect this to be the case.
Indeed, plugging (4) into our expression for the MRS (8) and rewriting, we
obtain:
∂Uim
∂Xi1
∂Uim
∂Xi2
=
{
1 + (Ri − 1) λ
∗
iE
λim
}
(1 + r) < (1 + r)
Keeping in mind that Ri as a share of total federal income will always be smaller
than 1, the MRS will clearly be smaller than (1+r). We have thus shown that when
federal decision making is modeled by use of the citizen-candidate model, states
will not only face a soft budget constraint but over-borrow because of it. What is
more, the borrowing cost faced by states in our setting will be lower compared to
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a situation where the federal government simply follows the median voter in each
state. In this case λim would be equal to λ
∗
iE , so that the MRS reduces to:
∂Uim
∂Xi1
∂Uim
∂Xi2
= {λimRi} (1 + r)
λim
< (1 + r)
Which is clearly larger than the MRS obtained in our model, rewritten by
plugging in (7) for λ∗iE in (8):
∂Uim
∂Xi1
∂Uim
∂Xi2
=
{
λimRi +
(
∂Ci2
∂w
∑m
j 6=i (njYj2)
niYi2Bi1(1 + r)
)
(Ri − 1)
}
(1 + r)
λim
≪ (1 + r)
This result suggests the soft budget constraint to be an even more pressing
problem when regional affiliation has the upper hand. Compared to a federal gov-
ernment which behaves in the usual Downsian fashion and follows the median voter,
a cooperative legislature over-borrows more inefficiently. Set against a benevolent
government which maximises the welfare of representative consumers, we get the
same result. Indeed, in such a setting each state's representative consumer is also
its median voter. We summarise in proposition 2:
Proposition 2. In a federation where a cooperative legislature of
locally elected representatives bargains on public spending, states face
a soft budget constraint and over-borrow inefficiently. Compared to a
setting where federal decision making does not result from bargaining
and regional affiliation, states over-borrow more inefficiently.
At first glance, such a result may readily be harnessed as further critique on vertical
fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, and in light of the arguments in favour of
imbalances as referred to in our introduction, a more constructive stance is also
at hand. From this perspective, proposition 2 can be seen as adding more weight
to recent calls for installing truly federal constituencies.15 Indeed, when federal
politicians are held accountable by all voters of a federation, and not just by a
favoured regional fraction, we return to the outcome obtained in a median voter
model (or a benevolent government model with representative consumers). The
excess in inefficiency would thus be undone without altering grant policies, grants
which can be welfare enhancing for a variety of other reasons.16
Secondly, proposition 2 might also render Goodspeed's (2002) proposed solution
to the SBC problem more effective. As Goodspeed pointed out, when the federal
government responds to increased state borrowing not only by bumping up grants
going to the borrowing state in question, but to all states, things take a turn for
the better. In this case the tax cost to borrowing could have a disciplining effect,
since states would realise they are indeed also partially financing grants going to
other states. When footing this bill becomes too costly compared to the decrease
in opportunity cost (which stays the same), state governments are less tempted to
over-borrow. If this increase in tax costs exactly offsets the drop in opportunity
15For Belgium, see e.g. Horowitz (2009), or Deschouwer & Van Parijs (2009).
16Again, see Boadway & Shah (2009).
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costs, the SBC policy would even result in efficient borrowing decisions. Since
our model has the federal government doling out overly generous grants, it could
deliver a stronger disciplining mechanism. Of course, such a setting needs to be
modeled to fully grasp its dynamics, which is why Goodspeed suggests adding spill-
overs to the model after all. When state public spending also affects the welfare of
non-residents, the federal government may indeed have good reason to increase all
grants when only one state borrows more. A promising avenue for further research.
Question also remains how our model of regional affiliation responds to state
heterogeneity in population size and income. We tackle this issue in the next
paragraph.
6 Heterogeneous states
Allowing for variety in state population size as well as incomes, we now solve the
same optimisation for the federal government and the federal voting process (see
appendix D). This gives us the following result for the federal vote in state i:
λ∗iE = λim +
(
∂Ci2
∂wi
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
− 1∑m
k
∂wk
∂Ck2
niYk2∑m
k nkYk2
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
(9)
Keeping things simple, and to focus ideas, we assume the marginal utility of
private consumption to be equal across states, so that:
λ∗iE = λim +
∂Ci2
∂wi
(∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
− 1∑m
k
niYk2∑m
k nkYk2
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
The question whether the elected preference type in region i will be larger than
the median voter's type now boils down to the following trade-off:∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
S 1∑m
k
niYk2∑m
k nkYk2
Simplified this becomes:
1
Yi2
>
1∑m
k Yk2
(10)
By consequence, when per capita income differs across states, voters will also
elect federal candidates with higher debt preferences than their own. Moreover,
lower relative per capita incomes has voters elect even more generous federal rep-
resentatives. Indeed, plugging (10) into (9) yields:
λ∗iE = λim +
(
1
Yi2
− 1∑m
k Yk2
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
Where we see between brackets how lower per capita income in state i as com-
pared to incomes in other states, drives up the federal voting outcome λ∗iE in that
12
same state. The inefficient over-borrowing resulting from this federal generosity
will thus be more outspoken in states with lower relative per capita incomes.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper revisited the soft budget constraint problem, empirically shown to arise
in many multi-tiered countries. New light was shed on the incentives at work when
lower-level (state) governments over-borrow, and are later on bailed out by the
federal level. Since complex regional bargaining and log-rolling often characterize
political decision making on this federal level, we sized up the effect of such 'regional
affiliation' using the citizen-candidate approach pioneered by Besley and Coate
(1997).
In our theoretical setup, representatives join a federal legislature once elected
regionally, and start bargaining on public spending. They agree on an allocation
which maximises their joint surplus, which is exactly the outcome regional affil-
iation produces in real life. Whenever locally elected politicians start behaving
like state representatives in the federal government, the compromise will be a well-
balanced mix of regional preferences. Moreover, by focusing on an intertemporal
setting where state governments are allowed to borrow and the federal government
co-finances regional spending, our model sets the stage for bailout incentives to take
shape. Not only were these bailout policies shown to be overly generous because of
strategic voting. Also, and compared to a setting where regional affiliation does not
bear on federal decision making, states over-borrowed more inefficiently because of
this generosity. Allowing for heterogeneity in state income and population did not
affect this inefficient outcome lastly. Lower relative per capita incomes even boost
federal generosity and subsequent over-borrowing by the states.
To neutralize the additional inefficiencies of regional affiliation, a case can be
made for federal constituencies where politicians are elected from across the entire
federation. This would eliminate most regional ties of federal politicians. Secondly,
since large swaths of EU policy are settled in the European Council, and thus
by consensus, our model also captures the European dimension. Political leaders
always keep their own member state in mind whilst bargaining, to the extent that
the council may just be the epitome of regional affiliation. A prediction would
then be that poorer member states, in terms of per capita income, send more
bailout-prone representatives to the table and over-borrow more.
Lastly, our results also put the effect of grant-based regional finance on over-
borrowing in a different light. The larger the vertical fiscal gap the argument
goes, the bigger the soft budget constraint problem (see e.g. Rodden, 2002, 2003;
Blankart and Klaiber, 2006, or Baskaran, 2012). Yet if regional affiliation itself
inflates the share of grant-based finance, the size effect of the vertical fiscal gap on
over-borrowing may be biased upwards. Indeed, and also argued by Rodden (2006),
when federal decision making is to a large degree interwoven with regional interests,
lower-level governments tend to be more grant financed. As such, a tentative
conclusion would be that the political and institutional setup of a federation not
only shapes bailout expectations, but determines the size of the vertical fiscal gap in
much the same way. In any case, when political power is distributed across different
13
levels of government in a clear cut way, and one level is not able to influence the
other, we expect bailouts as well as grant finance to play a smaller part.
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Appendix
A Calculations federal government's problem
Deriving the only first order condition gives us:
∂
∑m
k {UiE}
∂gi2
=
1
gi2 + ti2Yi2 − λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
−
m∑
k
Yk2
∂w
∂Ck2
ni∑m
k nkYk2
= 0
Which, under our simplifying assumptions, reduces to:
∂
∑m
i {UiE}
∂gi2
=
1
gi2 + ti2Yi2 − λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
− ∂w
∂Ci2
= 0
Or:
gi2 =
∂Ci2
∂w
− ti2Yi2 + λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
B Calculations voting process
Voter j in state i maximises his utility whilst voting:
MaxλiE ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + w (Ci1) + z (Ci2)
Subject to:
Xi1 = gi1 + ti1Yi1 + λijBi1
Xi2 = g
∗
i2 + ti2Yi2 − λijBi1(1 + r)
Ci1 = Yi1(1− ti1)
Ci2 = Yi2(1− ti2 −
∑m
i nig
∗
i2∑m
i niYi2
)
tf2
m∑
i
niYi2 =
m∑
i
nigi2
g∗i2 =
∂Ci2
∂wi
− ti2Yi2 + λiEBi1(1 + r)
Which yields the following first order condition:
Uij
∂λiE
=
1
∂Ci2
∂wi
− ti2Yi2 + λiEBi1(1 + r) + ti2Yi2 − λijBi1(1 + r)
Bi1(1+r)− ∂w
∂Ci2
niYi2∑m
i niYi2
Bi1(1+r) = 0
Or:
∂Ci2
∂wi
+ (λiE − λij)Bi1(1 + r) = ∂Ci2
∂w
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
Which gives us:
λiE = λij +
∂Ci2
∂w
(∑m
j 6=i njYj2
niYi2
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
17
C Calculations state government's problem
MaxBi1,ti1,ti2Uim = ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + z (Ci1) + w (Ci2)
Subject to the same constraints as before.
Xi1 = gi1 + ti1Yi1 + λimBi1
Xi2 = g
∗
i2 + ti2Yi2 − λimBi1(1 + r)
Ci1 = Yi1(1− ti1)
Ci2 = Yi2(1− ti2 − tf2)
tf2
m∑
i
niYi2 =
m∑
i
nig
∗
i2
g∗i2 =
∂Ci2
∂w
− ti2Yi2 + λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
The optimisation problem yields the following first order conditions:
∂Uim
∂Xi1
Yi1 − ∂z
∂Ci2
Yi1 = 0
∂Uim
∂Xi2
Yi2 − ∂w
∂Ci2
Yi2 = 0
∂Uim
∂Bi1
=
∂Uim
∂Xi1
λim +
∂Uim
∂Xi2
∂Xi2
∂Bi1
− ∂w
∂Ci2
niYi2∑m
k nkYk2
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
= 0 (11)
So that we can rewrite (11) as:
∂Uim
∂Xi1
λim = −∂Uim
∂Xi2
(
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
− λim(1 + r)
)
+
∂Uim
∂Xi2
niYi2∑m
k nkYk2
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
Or:
∂Uim
∂Xi1
∂Uim
∂Xi2
=
{
Ri
∂g∗i2
∂Bi1
+
(
λim(1 + r)− ∂g
∗
i2
∂Bi1
)}
1
λim
= 0
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D Calculations Heterogeneous States
D.1 Federal government
Maxgi2
m∑
i
{UiE}
UiE = ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + zi (Ci1) + wi (Ci2)
Xi1 = gi1 + ti1Yi1 + λ
∗
iEBi1
Xi2 = gi2 + ti2Yi2 − λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
Ci1 = Yi1(1− ti1) (12)
Ci2 = Yi2(1− ti2 − tf2) (13)
tf2
m∑
i
niYi2 =
m∑
i
nigi2 (14)
Deriving the only first order condition gives us:
∂
∑m
k {UiE}
∂gi2
=
1
gi2 + ti2Yi2 − λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
−
m∑
k
Yk2
∂wk
∂Ck2
ni∑m
k nkYk2
= 0
So that:
gi2 =
1
A
− ti2Yi2 + λ∗iEBi1(1 + r)
With
A =
m∑
k
∂wk
∂Ck2
niYk2∑m
k nkYk2
(15)
D.2 Federal voting process
Voter j in state i maximises his utility whilst voting:
MaxλiE ln(Xi1) + ln(Xi2) + wi (Ci1) + zi (Ci2)
Subject to:
Xi1 = gi1 + ti1Yi1 + λijBi1
Xi2 = g
∗
i2 + ti2Yi2 − λijBi1(1 + r)
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Ci1 = Yi1(1− ti1)
Ci2 = Yi2(1− ti2 −
∑m
i nig
∗
i2∑m
i niYi2
)
tf2
m∑
i
niYi2 =
m∑
i
nigi2
g∗i2 =
1
A
− ti2Yi2 + λiEBi1(1 + r)
Which yields the following first order condition:
Uij
∂λiE
=
1
1
A − ti2Yi2 + λiEBi1(1 + r) + ti2Yi2 − λijBi1(1 + r)
Bi1(1+r)− ∂wi
∂Ci2
niYi2∑m
i niYi2
Bi1(1+r) = 0
Or:
1
A
+ (λiE − λij)Bi1(1 + r) = ∂Ci2
∂wi
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
(λiE − λij) =
(
∂Ci2
∂wi
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
− 1
A
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
So that:
λiE = λij +
(
∂Ci2
∂wi
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
− 1
A
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
And, plugging in (15):
λ∗iE = λim +
(
∂Ci2
∂wi
∑m
k nkYk2
niYi2
− 1∑m
k
∂wk
∂Ck2
niYk2∑m
k nkYk2
)
1
Bi1(1 + r)
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